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Between the Party and the European Union?  
The Regulation of Working Time in France 
Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos 
 
Do parties matter when EU policy is implemented in France?* This article 
examines this question first in the context of cleavage theory and the 
literature on party positioning on European integration that draws 
attention to the origin and the nature of party preferences,and second in 
light of empirical evidence from the implementation of the Working Time 
Directive in France. It shows that, when faced with the same issue, 
governments of different ideological orientation responded in a way that 
reflected their historically defined référentiel rather than an EU Diktat. 
The argument here, then, is that far from ending domestic political 
contestation on the Left-Right axis, European integration and its concrete 
domestic manifestations in France are in fact subject to it.  
 
Party Government and International Governance 
The growing involvement of international fora (such as the G20), regimes, 
institutions, organizations or even regional quasi-polities (such as the European 
Union) in an increasing number of policy areas ranging from agriculture to defense is 
often thought to have contributed to the erosion of both the autonomy of the nation 
state and the traditional distinction between the political Left and Right. Recent 
research on France highlights both a course au centre amongst the mainstream parties 
and a growing belief amongst citizens that the differences between the Left and the 
Right are diminishing in part due to globalization and, more importantly, as a result of 
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membership of the EU.1 The fact that EU law is binding and takes precedence over 
national legislation, combined with EU’s propensity to produce “relatively centrist”2 
policies, might appear to lend support to the notion of curtailed national autonomy 
and increasing convergence between the Left and the Right, at least in terms of socio-
economic policies. This is particularly important in France since the autonomy of the 
government and the capacity of parties of different ideological persuasion to make a 
difference at the national level was a central component of the debate within the Parti 
Socialiste and the wider French electorate with regard to the ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty.   
There are, however, three reasons to challenge this argument. First, voter de-
alignment and other factors might well have promoted a move to the center, but 
domestic political (especially electoral) contestation coupled with distinctive 
historically defined référentiel are counterveiling forces inducing the main parties to 
pursue policies that distinguish them from their competitors in the domestic political 
arena.3 Second, when national governments implement EU policies at the national 
level, they make consequential choices, rather than act as automata, because much of 
the EU’s activity in socio-economic regulation leaves room for discretion, at least 
when it comes to the pursuit of higher standards. Finally, despite its pivotal role in the 
process of integration, France’s record in implementing EU policies made under the 
old ‘first pillar’—the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic 
Community—is far from impeccable.4 The analysis of the mere transposition5 of EU 
social legislation into French law has led scholars to categorize France as “a prime 
example of [the world of] neglect motivated by a kind of national ‘arrogance’” 
because of the predominance of domestic policy considerations, which implies that 
“compliance with EU law is no goal in itself”.6  
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Taken together, these three points indicate that an analysis that focuses on the 
partisan composition of the French government might help paint a more nuanced and 
accurate picture of the implications of EU membership for the autonomy of French 
governments. Yet the welcome focus of much of the existing literature on domestic 
factors7 does not extend to the partisan dimension.8  It does not, for example, take into 
account the change of party in government, which is an eminent expression of 
political change at the domestic level and a central attribute of advanced liberal 
democracies such as France. This is surprising since it is precisely in this political 
space that policy agreed upon beyond the state is implemented. A change of party in 
government can lead to a change of priorities or the use of different ways and means 
of dealing with a given policy issue.9 The scholarly discussion of the “parties matter” 
thesis pre-dates the intensification of globalization in general and European 
integration in particular,10 but the logic that underpins it has re-surfaced in recent 
research dealing with core EU policies, such as competition policy,11 and overall 
attitudes towards European integration.12 However, this central proposition has not 
been tested on the basis of detailed qualitative case studies focusing on the stage of 
policy implementation (“the continuation of politics by other means”13) which is when 
governing parties can make a difference through how they choose to allocate their 
attention and resources.  
The empirical evidence I utilize in this article is drawn from the transposition 
and implementation of the Working Time Directive14 by governments of different 
political persuasions in France. This directive exemplifies the EU’s style of socio-
economic regulation, thus it allows us to draw wider conclusions.15 It involves 
specific common minimum standards that must be met within a concrete time frame, 
while individual member states retain a degree of discretion mainly with regards to 
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pursuing higher standards. The Working Time Directive is particularly important 
because it directly relates to the most salient issue dimension in French politics, 
namely the socio-economic domain.16 A controversial piece of legislation, the 
directive pitted neo-liberals against the supporters of regulated capitalism. If parties 
matter, one would expect the handling of this issue in France―the country where the 
distinction between the Left and the Right was born―to vary as a function of the 
party in power. In addition, France’s long-established system of labor inspectorates17 
could reasonably be expected to cope with the exigencies of a Directive that did not 
depart radically from French domestic policy.18 Moreover, the regulation of working 
time has been a key policy area for governments of both the Left and the Right in 
France and a contentious matter between them at least since the 1930s due to 
employment and income policy considerations, their projet de société, or both. 
Nevertheless, socio-economic issues are precisely the policy domain where Left and 
Right are thought to have converged in the last two decades in Europe in general and 
in France in particular. So how have governments of the Left and Right―faced with 
the same set of issues in the same political, social, economic, and institutional 
milieu―handled the issue of working time in general and the Working Time 
Directive in particular?  
The next section draws on cleavage theory and the literature on party 
positioning on European integration in order to demonstrate in theoretical terms why 
party preferences should be expected to differ in a given member state in terms of 
their location in the EU political space. The third section focuses on the comparison 
of the behaviour of French governments of the Right and Left since the adoption of 
the directive so as to demonstrate empirically that when they exercise power, parties 
actually behave in different ways. Using process tracing19 to analyze this case 
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diachronically, and drawing on a broad range of sources including twenty-nine 
interviews conducted in 2009 with elite participants (including politicians, trade 
unionists, and several labor inspectors with experience from different policy areas and 
parts of France) analysis shows that first, each political family’s historically defined 
“prism” filters new challenges and leads to diverging attitudes and second, the change 
in government led to differences in the domestic pattern of implementation. This 
change is consistent with the partisan hypothesis: since parties rely on different 
référentiels and are located in different parts of the EU political space, their action 
reflects these differences in the context of the implementation of EU policy at the 
domestic level. To illustrate the point about partisan influence on the politics of 
implementation, it is important to demonstrate precisely how party behavior is linked 
to their respective référentiel. The next section draws on cleavage theory and outlines 
how these prisms come about.  
 
Between the Party and the Nation? Political Contestation in the EU 
Two dimensions define the structure of political contestation in the EU.20  The 
vertical dimension relates to the issue of sovereignty: those who support deeper 
integration are distinguished from those who seek to preserve the nation state.  The 
horizontal dimension reflects the conflict between the Left and the Right that remains 
an enduring organizing principle of political contestation in European states.21  On 
issues of redistribution and the regulation of capitalism, parties of the Right aim to 
reduce taxes, government spending, regulation, and the role of the government in the 
economy while parties of the Left hold the belief that government should remain a 
significant actor in the economy.  More broadly, unlike the Right, the Left supports 
intervention to promote equality and a more substantial conception of liberty.  
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Where are parties located in this structure of political contestation and why? In 
the study of European integration, national governments22 and the “national interest” 
were core features of theories derived from the study of international relations. Since 
European integration is thought―from that perspective―to proceed on the basis of 
bargaining between national governments, the national location of a political party 
would be expected to determine its preferences. Comparativists, on the other hand, 
have taken issue with this view. Marks and Wilson have sought to explain the position 
of national political parties on European (political and economic) integration between 
1984 and 199623 on the basis of cleavage theory (put forward by Lipset and Rokkan) 
and new institutionalism. In their classic examination of political development in 
Western Europe Lipset and Rokkan construed modern European party systems as the 
products of historical conflicts that took place between the Protestant Reformation 
and the Industrial Revolution that created dichotomies of interests (center-periphery, 
church against the state, primary against the secondary economy and, finally, the class 
cleavage pitting labor against capital). The interactions between these cleavages 
subsequently shaped political alignments. Enduring and distinct identities, institutions 
and patterns of political conflict have been created that explain the “freezing”24 as 
well as national variations in party systems. Second, as institutionalists have claimed, 
organizations handle new issues on the basis of existing schemes and standard 
operating procedures.25  
 On the basis of these two claims Marks and Wilson hypothesize that these 
cleavages constitute institutional frameworks or “prisms” through which political 
parties respond to new issues such as European integration. Using empirical evidence 
from an expert survey, they conclude that parties assimilate the new issue of 
European integration into pre-existing ideologies that are shared by party leadership, 
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activists and constituencies and mirror enduring commitments on core domestic 
issues. As a result of their use of these historically defined “prisms”―a form of 
shared référentiel, parties develop preferences on European integration that have 
much more in common with other parties in the same political family than they do 
with other parties in the same country.26   
Mainstream parties (Social Democrats, Liberals, Christian Democrats, and 
Conservatives) are divided into two groups, namely those who support regulated 
capitalism and the proponents of neo-liberal capitalism.27 Right of Center parties 
support market integration―in other words, “they support European integration in 
general terms―but they oppose policies, particularly concerning the environment, 
cohesion, or employment, that regulate capitalism.”28 Neo-liberal capitalism seeks to 
insulate markets from the political sphere. Support for the single market project under 
narrowly defined supranational supervision is combined with decisionmaking in fora 
where national governments retain a privileged role unlike the national arena where 
they are faced with historically rooted social groups such as unions and directly 
elected parliaments. Competition extends to firms and workers, as well as 
governments.  The latter compete in an effort to attract mobile factors of production, 
especially capital. 
On the other hand, economic realities gradually led the Social Democrats to a 
less sanguine view vis-à-vis the social democratic model at the national level. Social 
Democrats now lend their support to European integration as the means to pursue the 
political regulation of capitalism. Its supporters accept the notion that 
markets―instead of governments―ought to allocate resources, but they also stress 
the need for positive and negative regulation which, in many cases is more effective at 
the European level. They also support social dialogue and active policies that seek to 
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enable the less well-off to compete more effectively. Finally, unlike many of their 
opponents, supporters of regulated capitalism favor the enhancement of democratic 
institutions at the European level, which is where many consequential decisions are 
made.29 As a result, the Left―Right dimension is associated with differences in 
support for EU action in a number of policy areas.30  
On that basis it is possible to define the “partisan hypothesis” regarding the 
implementation of EU public policy at the domestic level: the historically defined 
party preferences on European integration shape a party’s stance on the 
implementation of individual policies. Since the issue of European integration is 
assimilated into pre-existing ideologies that are shared by party leadership, activists 
and constituencies and mirror enduring commitments on core domestic issues, these 
historically defined prisms come into play when EU policy is implemented at the 
national level. When in power, parties are expected to deal with the exigencies of EU 
policy implementation in a manner that reflects their commitment to the 
aforementioned “prisms.” In other words, the implementation of EU policy at the 
national level reflects long-standing, historically defined cleavages. Political parties 
use these prisms to make sense of what is at stake, define their position and shape 
outcomes. The next section examines this hypothesis in the context of the 
implementation of the Working Time Directive in France.   
 
The Working Time Directive in France 
Plus ça change? 
The Directive is a complex piece of legislation, originally proposed in 1990 but 
adopted in amended form in 1993. While it explicitly stipulates that individual 
member states reserve the right to apply higher standards, it establishes compulsory 
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minimum standards regarding the amount of time a worker can be required to work 
(forty-eight hours per week on average including overtime) and the amount of time a 
night worker can be required to work (an average of eight in twenty-four hours of 
work) coupled with record-keeping requirements regarding the regular use of night 
workers, a right for night workers31 to receive free health assessments before their 
employment in night shifts and at regular intervals thereafter. In addition, it creates 
the right to eleven consecutive hours of rest per day and (when the working day is 
longer than six hours) the right to an in-work rest break, a weekly rest period of thirty-
five consecutive hours, a day off each week and four weeks’ paid leave per annum. 
The directive also offers the possibility of various derogations and exemptions, in part 
as concessions made in an effort to keep the Conservative British government “on 
board.” The most important concession was the “opt-out” clause whereby member 
states have the right to introduce legislation that allows individual workers to exceed 
the forty-eight-hour limit. Other concessions include derogations (without 
compensation) from the provisions on daily and weekly rest periods, breaks, limits to 
work at night, the weekly work limit and the reference period used to calculate 
working hours for various groups, activities, and occupations (such as executives, 
family workers, and clergymen).  
In short, the Working Time Directive sets minimum standards in some key 
areas, which are coupled with considerable scope for discretion in others and an 
emphasis on the involvement of the “social partners.”32 It deals with value-laden 
issues such as the autonomy of the market, the individual as a worker-economic unit 
or a multi-faceted human being, the autonomy of intermediary institutions, and the 
role of the state in the management of economic affairs. The directive also symbolizes 
an uneasy compromise between neo-liberals who oppose the intervention of public 
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authorities in this area on grounds of efficiency, and the supporters of regulated 
capitalism, who support it because of its social considerations and its implications for 
employment, productivity33 and health.34 
The regulation of working time has been a major political issue for decades in 
France. In substantive terms, the French policy tradition entails the gradual reduction 
of working time, starting from the legislative protection of children working in new 
industries such as textile and mining in the mid-nineteenth century. However, this 
broad trend does not obscure major differences between the Left and the Right. The 
Left often promoted the reduction of working time first as a means to create jobs, and 
second, as an expression of its projet de société, highlighting the importance of the 
temps choisi and quality of life as exemplified by the introduction of a two-week paid 
holiday entitlement by the Léon Blum-led government in 1936 (and its subsequent 
extension by the Socialists to three and five weeks in 1956 and 1982, respectively).  
The Right, on the other hand, often introduced reductions that were defensive and 
aimed at job protection. The French Left and the Right have operated in a context 
underpinned by the prevailing culture of collective bargaining,35 but the Left―unlike 
the Right―has used legislation extensively so as to set higher standards.36 This is so 
because for parties of the Left the relationship between employers and employees is 
an unbalanced one. As a result, the Left is much more willing than the Right to 
intervene.  
There are both differences and similarities (be they of degree or principle) 
between the French Left and Right on the regulation of working time. Although their 
respective positions until and during the 1990s should be placed on different parts of a 
continuum (rather than a clear dichotomy) the reforms introduced after the Right’s 
return to power in 2002 mark a clear break with the past. The forty-hour week 
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introduced in 1936 by the government of the Front Populaire and the reduction of the 
durée légale to thirty-nine hours without salary reduction in 198237 are emblematic 
examples of the Left’s belief that the mandatory reduction of the durée légale38 is not 
beyond the remit of the state, as well as a greater concern with the duration of 
working time as a key determinant of productivity, employment levels, and the 
availability of labor.39 A key implication of the Left’s greater willingness to reduce 
the durée légale was the treatment of overtime as a problem that required a solution, 
rather than a practice that ought to be encouraged. Moreover, unlike the Right that 
supports part-time work, the Left considers it as temps subi, not the kind of 
employment that is chosen genuinely freely.40 Also, both the Left and the Right have 
been willing to finance working time reductions and deal with the organization of 
working time (i.e. choices regarding its use such as flexibility clauses etc), the Right 
was much more generous in terms of the former41 and keener in terms of the latter. 
The latter is mainly an issue of degree, rather than principle. Indeed, in 1982 the 
Socialists introduced legislation that allowed collective agreements reached at the 
sectoral or firm level to diverge from legislative provisions.42 Until then, agreement at 
two levels, both sector and firm, was required. The trend towards further 
decentralization was subsequently enhanced by governments of the Left43 but much 
more energetically by the Right.44 However, the key difference remains unaltered: for 
the Left intervention is necessary to rectify the inequality between workers and their 
employers―a decision that is also linked to the weakness of trade unions in France.  
 
The politics of transposition 
Before the transposition of the Directive the weekly durée légale was thirty-nine 
hours in addition to up to 130 hours per annum of overtime while the daily working 
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time limit was ten hours.45 Nevertheless, collective agreements reached set different 
limits (between thirty-seven and forty-eight hours per week and up to twelve hours 
per day) with between seventy and 130 hours of overtime per annum, regulated rest 
breaks, and allowed the use of longer reference periods (up to a year) and 
compensatory rest for overtime worked. As regards weekly rest, there was a statutory 
limit of twenty-four hours that included Sunday.46 Finally, there was a ban on night 
work for women. These arrangements differed from the provisions of the Directive in 
terms of night work, the absence of a statutory limit regarding daily rest and an 
eleven-hour difference in terms of weekly rest. However, the combined effect of the 
aforementioned provisions and those contained in collective agreements meant 
that―despite these legal differences, there was no major conflict between the French 
arrangements and the directive,47 except in terms of night work. For example, given 
the limit48 placed on overtime (130 hours), workers in France would not exceed forty-
two hours (on average) per week. 
Although the directive had been proposed and negotiated while the Socialists 
were in power in France, it was formally adopted eights months after the Center-
Right’s return to power following the elections of March 1993. Unlike the 
Conservative British government, the new French government of the Center-Right did 
not oppose the directive, nor did it transpose it during the three-year transition that 
ended in November 1996, despite having a robust majority in Parliament and the fact 
that a major law was adopted in the same policy area during this period. While the loi 
Robien of 199649 promoted the Right’s preferred approach―including 
“annualization”50 (which furthers flexibility), trading reductions in salary and/or 
working time for job protection backed with generous state-funded incentives―it did 
not seek to transpose the Working Time Directive. An attempt made by the Balladur 
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government in 1994 to begin the process of transposition did not bear fruit. The draft 
of the décret Giraud remained dormant as it coincided with mass demonstrations 
against other aspects of the government’s employment policy, namely the contrat 
d’insertion professionnelle. In the meantime the European Commission had contacted 
the French authorities as a result of the French government’s failure to transpose the 
Working Time Directive―in particular the provisions regarding weekly rest periods 
and the duration of night work.51 In its response of March 1997 the French 
government acknowledged this lacuna and stated that this would be remedied by the 
end of June 1997, after the surprise election called by President Chirac. 
The Socialists had not lost faith in the policy relevance of the reduction of 
working time. It was shared more widely within the French Left, including trade 
unions,52 who saw it as a way of sharing the proceeds of technological and other 
forms of progress that had led to major increases in productivity. Lionel Jospin’s 
platform for the presidential election of 1995 included the reduction of working time 
to 37.5 hours but his defeat delayed his ambitions until 1997 when the Gauche 
plurielle won a resounding victory. The radical (but gradual) reduction of statutory 
working time from 39 to 35 hours without salary reduction featured prominently in 
the Socialists’ election manifesto.53 Once the government had defined the direction 
and, subsequently, the calendar for the implementation of this major reform, it would 
be up to the social partners to negotiate the practicalities so as to ensure that sectoral 
and other idiosyncracies would be taken into account. Combating working time 
abuses and the use of overtime was―in addition to the fight against 
unemployment―the explicit aim of this reform.  
This policy differed from the policy pursued by the Center-Right in two 
senses. First, the Gauche plurielle opted against salary reductions (in line with the 
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Socialists’ decision of 1982) so as to maintain the employees’ purchasing power and, 
as a consequence, their capacity to contribute to growth. Second, the new policy 
combined the reduction of statutory working time with a determination to drastically 
discourage recourse to overtime, which was a major innovation. Allowing employers 
and employees to make extensive use of overtime would reduce the pressure for job 
creation thus undermining the central objective of this major political decision.  
The government of the Left took action that involved both domestic policy 
change and the transposition of the Directive through the enactment of the lois Aubry, 
despite ferocious opposition from the major national employers’ associations and 
their political allies54 and criticism from some economists.55 The first Aubry law56 
abolished the system introduced by the Robien Law, dealt with issues regarding the 
transposition of the Working Time Directive57 and set out the basic parameters of the 
major policy reform. It left room for negotiations between the social partners on 
practical details―notably major issues such as the definition of overtime, part-time 
work, and minimum wage. In that sense, faithful to its tradition, the government of 
the Left restored the pre-eminence of the legislative route and encouraged 
negotiations between the social partners. These two methods were combined because 
of the weakness of the French trade unions. As a Socialist former Prime Minister put 
it, “avec un taux de syndicalisation de 8.5 pour cent, il n’y a que la loi. On n’a pas le 
choix.”58  
The full transposition of the directive59 entailed the introduction of a new 
definition of working time, the modification of the Code du travail by a series of 
decrees covering rest periods in specific sectors, the adoption of the second Aubry 
law60 that resolved the problem of the twenty-four-hour weekly rest period and a 
law61 that dealt with issues regarding night work. The first Aubry law offered a new 
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definition of actual working time and reduced statutory working time to thirty-five 
hours per week. This would apply from 1 January 2000 to firms employing twenty 
persons or more and two years later for the rest. The same law also encouraged firms 
to negotiate with their employees a more rapid reduction of working time. The 
provision of financial aid was conditional on job creation (at least 6 percent for a 10 
percent reduction of working time) and the commitment to maintain these jobs for at 
least two years. The second Aubry law built on the agreements that had been 
concluded in the meantime62 and guaranteed the income of minimum wage workers 
for five years, significantly reduced the conditions for the provision of financial 
incentives to firms, and did not make particular demands on firms with regards to the 
calculation of the time actually worked.  
Although France was not amongst the problematic EU member states in terms 
of the length of working time, the transposition of the Working Time Directive 
contributed to the re-balancing of the relationship between the social partners. 
Between them, the directive and domestic French legislation defined boundaries that 
curtailed the employers’ autonomy whilst strengthening the employees’ collective 
bargaining position. This contrasts markedly with the reforms introduced by the Right 
after its return to power in 2002 (see below). Although both of the main political 
camps in France traditionally place significant emphasis on the role of the social 
partners in this policy area, the Right―unlike the Left―was willing to do so without 
using legislation to frame the substantive decisions that would subsequently be made 
by the social partners.63 This implies a belief in the neutrality of the state that is not 
shared by the Left. For the Left, negotiating power is not divided evenly between the 
social partners, thus the state has a duty to intervene. As will be demonstrated below, 
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the Right returned to these arrangements in an effort to alter the balance of power 
between employers and employees in the opposite direction.  
The Jospin government significantly reduced the incentives for overtime—any  
time actually worked over and above thirty-five hours—in an effort to boost job 
creation. Until then―and after the return of the Right to power in 2002―these 
incentives were strong. Despite the premium rate of pay, employers preferred utilizing 
their existing workforce instead of recruiting and training new staff.64 On this thorny 
issue, the Jospin government’s decisions reflected an effort to find the middle way 
between trade unions and employers. The former, by and large, supported the 
reduction of overtime while the latter preferred its expansion. The second Aubry law 
left the limit intact except in cases of collective agreements that contain flexibility 
clauses enabling firms to deal with seasonal variation in their workload.65 In addition, 
the option of utilizing the individual opt-out―the most controversial aspect of the 
directive―was rejected because the corresponding clause of the directive was seen as 
a temporary measure and, above all, its utilization was construed as unacceptable in 
the French context.66 Finally, the Aubry laws dealt with the contentious issue of the 
working time of cadres. Until the late 1990s, their working time was covered by the 
general arrangements regarding other employees but French courts had acknowledged 
the exception of those whose pay is independent of their working time, usually senior 
executives whose tasks involve a significant degree of autonomy.67 The second Aubry 
law formalized this arrangement specifically for this narrow category of executives as 
a response to the wishes68 of the trade unions CFE-CGC and CFDT that are well-
represented amongst unionized cadres and to the employers’ attempt to extend the 
exemption to non-executives. It allows the conclusion of collective agreements that 
set a limit of 217 days per annum (forfait en jours, a working time package calculated 
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in days rather than hours) for these executives, thus accepting that they could exceed 
the daily and weekly limits but ought to comply with the minimum daily and weekly 
rest periods (eleven and thirty-five consecutive hours respectively) introduced by the 
directive. The government’s recognition of the specificity of the role of modern 
executives (in line with the directive) has had significant implications69 at the stage of 
the implementation of these provisions (see below) partly because it has not been 
accompanied by safeguard measures. 
 
Beyond transposition: the impact of alternance 
Although the actual implementation of the framework put in place by the government 
of the Left has been marked by enduring (not party-specific) features of the French 
system (such as the complexity of legislation), evidence also indicates that the 
orientation of the parties in power directly affects the pattern of implementation even 
in a country where the directive per se was not itself controversial. In other words, 
who is in power matters, in line with the partisan hypothesis. As will be demonstrated 
below, decisions made by the government of the day in pursuit of domestically-
defined policy priorities have affected the implementation of the directive.   
France was not thought to be associated with excessive working hours70 at the 
time of the transposition of the Working Time Directive, on account of its labor 
legislation as well as the presence, since the nineteenth century, of the Inspecteurs du 
travail—who are responsible for its implementation on a day-to-day basis. They have 
wide-ranging powers to police the implementation of these provisions including the 
power to enter premises and obtain information that they can then use to initiate legal 
proceedings against employers suspected of breaches. They also provide information 
and advice to employers and employees, and facilitate the amicable resolution of 
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differences. Nevertheless, the implementation of the Aubry laws mirrors both market 
realities and political priorities. After the return of the Right to power in 2002, this 
pattern became more pronounced in a manner that confirms the partisan hypothesis 
outlined above.  
The implementation of the Aubry laws has three basic characteristics. First, it 
led to the creation of a significant number of jobs71 as a result of reduced working 
time, salary moderation, and increased flexibility. Second, it promoted the 
diversification of the workforce, even within the same firm. Finally, it further 
promoted flexibility and has affected the quality of working conditions. The 
combination of reduced working time and increased flexibility deployed by the 
government of the Left was compatible with the directive. During this process the 
active French framework remained above the level stipulated, whereas the post-2002 
drive towards liberalization introduced by the Right transformed the directive into a 
safety net for employees.  
By the end of 2001 average weekly working time had been reduced to thirty-
six hours72 and approximately 300,000 jobs had been created, though the impact was 
greater in the firms that used the incentives offered by the laws than those that did not. 
This trend was not focused on part-time jobs. Finally, the introduction of the new 
system reduced the pace of recourse to fixed-term jobs.73 The reduction of working 
time and the concomitant creation of jobs were largely based on increased flexibility 
(in line with the options offered by the Working Time Directive) and wage restraint74 
both of which were accepted by the employees and their representatives in 
conjunction with the initiative taken by Socialist-led government of the Gauche 
plurielle. Flexibility took two forms: modulation75 and further recourse to the 
calculation of working time on an annual basis (“annualization”).76 Workers and their 
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representatives accepted the combined recourse to these forms of flexibility only after 
the government had turned them into parts of a broader and more transparent trade-off 
that also involved reduced working time as well as job creation. Though this part of 
the trade-off can be said to have operated in the way foreseen by the government, 
increased flexibility also generated problems in some sectors of the economy, 
including the problem of non-payment of overtime due to the extension of the 
reference period to a year.77 It thus enhanced—at least initially—the appeal of the 
Right’s response to the Aubry laws, especially in the run-up to the 2007 presidential 
election, in which the Right’s candidate (Nicolas Sarkozy) campaigned on the slogan 
“travailler plus pour gagner plus.”  
Unlike executives and other employees with higher qualifications, less 
qualified staff (especially women) were much less satisfied78 due to the use of 
modulation, employers’ unilateral decisions regarding their new working time 
arrangements, and the overall intensification of work. Workers in this category often 
have even less autonomy in determining their work schedule and holidays, have to 
perform the same (or more) tasks in shorter periods of time and have often remained 
unaffected by job creation within the firm because new posts have not always been 
allocated to the units where work had intensified.79 Other problems that were 
amplified after the return of the Right to power in 2002 occurred while some of the 
flexibility-related provisions of the Aubry laws were in force.  
Cadres were working long hours even before the adoption of the Aubry laws80 
in part because their roles involve a degree of autonomy that is absent from the roles 
performed by other employees. To that extent, the Aubry laws recognized a concrete 
reality by introducing cadre-specific clauses such as the forfait en jours. The 
extension of the logic of these more flexible clauses to wider groups of employees 
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after 2002 corresponds to the Right’s determination to undermine as much as possible 
the framework introduced by the government of the Gauche plurielle, but in reality 
the problem originates not so much from the inconsistency of the law itself (or 
whether the daily and weekly rest limits are observed) but the relative autonomy of 
the employer to designate who falls into that category. This was at the heart of 
reforms introduced by the Right after 2002.  
 Two important sources of problems were structural:  first, the weaknesses of the 
trade unions, and second, the complexity of the law. Trade unions were not always in 
a position to play an active role in the implementation of agreements even when these 
agreements allowed them to do so (as was often the case). Also, union officials 
acknowledged that even health and safety committees at firm level were not always in 
a position to fill the gap.81 This problem is directly linked not only to the low levels of 
unionization, especially in the private sector, but also the increasing individualization 
of the workforce―which the Aubry laws inadvertently encouraged. The second 
problem that preceded the adoption of the Aubry laws82 but was exacerbated by them 
(and much more so by the reforms introduced by the Right after 2002) is the 
complexity of the law. This is linked to simple issues of legislative drafting and the 
adoption of several clauses that derogate from, partly amend, repeal or extend 
previous arrangements. It is also a result of key substantive choices such as the 
recourse to annualization and increased emphasis on the level of the firm and the 
individualization of work timetables. The combination of these factors undermines the 
capacity of labor inspectors to perform their duties. This problem has been 
exacerbated by conscious decisions made by the governments of the Right after 2002, 
but it was present as early as 2001.83  
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The response of the Right after its return to power in 2002 was a direct and 
sustained84 effort to turn the regulation of working time into a core aspect of 
competition between firms. Whereas in the past the differences between the two main 
political camps allowed the domestic regulation of working time to remain clearly 
above the standards stipulated by the Working Time Directive, the post-2002 reforms 
introduced by the Right effectively turned EU legislation into a safety net for French 
employees. The Right’s pursuit of liberalization pushes standards much closer to (or, 
at times, even below) the level stipulated by the directive. These reforms focus on 
three core elements of the Aubry laws—the duration and cost of overtime and―more 
importantly―flexibility. As regards overtime, the Right’s choices contradict those of 
the Gauche plurielle. In terms of flexibility, the Right has promoted it even further. 
While not explicitly abolishing the thirty-five-hour week, these changes have 
transformed it beyond recognition in a manner that directly corresponds to the wishes 
of the patronat. As early as 2000 the Mouvement des Entreprises de France 
(MEDEF), France’s biggest union for employers, was calling for a radical reform that 
would turn the firm into the core of the system, reversing the hitherto existing 
hierarchy of norms. This amounted to major changes in the mode of the regulation of 
working time and the balance of power between employers and employees. This is 
precisely what followed the Right’s electoral victories in 2002 and, especially, in 
2007. 
In one of the first measures of the Raffarin government, François Fillon―then 
labor minister―left the durée légale intact but dramatically increased the overtime 
quota,85 thus effectively raising weekly working time from thirty-five to thirty-nine 
hours86 despite opposition from trade unions. This was a victory for the employers 
whose representatives had unsuccessfully sought to obtain the same result when the 
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second Aubry law was being prepared.87 The loi Fillon also significantly reduced the 
cost of overtime and generalized the system of forfait en jours that had hitherto been 
limited to executives. The reduction of the cost of overtime is couched in the belief 
(widely shared amongst politicians on the Right of the political spectrum) that job 
creation under the Aubry laws owes much more to the reduction of labor costs than 
the reduction of statutory working time.  
The other central aspect of the reforms introduced after 2002 concerns the 
hierarchy of norms in the area of employment legislation and the extension of the 
scope for derogations.88 Until then agreements reached at one level of collective 
bargaining (e.g. the firm) could derogate from an agreement reached at a higher level 
(e.g. the sector) only if these derogations were beneficial for the workers. This 
fundamental principle of French labor law reflected the notion that the relationship of 
employment was not balanced and―as a result―the weaker party (i.e. the individual 
worker) ought to be protected and this was part of the role of the state which, clearly, 
was not (indeed, should not be) neutral. The new arrangement allows such 
derogations in most aspects of employment relations unless the agreement reached at 
the higher level explicitly excludes this possibility (which effectively offers 
employers veto power). Crucially, the new law allows89 agreements at the level of 
firms to cover issues―such as overtime quotas and the premium paid for 
overtime―that had hitherto been reserved for negotiations at the sectoral level where 
the bargaining power of the employees’ representatives is greater. In short, the new 
arrangements decentralized bargaining towards the firm and enhanced the bargaining 
power of employers vis-à-vis employees. Finally, the role of street-level implementers 
has become a great deal more difficult because an already complicated set of 
arrangements has been rendered even more complex.  
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The reforms that followed amplified the trend towards more flexibility, 
especially after the elections of 2007. Nicolas Sarkozy had campaigned vigorously on 
the need for economic reform along neo-liberal lines.90 The loi en faveur du travail, 
de l’emploi et du pouvoir d’achat (loi TEPA91) and the law enacted in August 2008,92 
further amplified the key features of the policy of the Right—flexibility and recourse 
to artificially cheaper overtime. Finally, in a move of great symbolic importance, 
since 2008 the working time-related provisions of the Code du Travail appear in the 
part that concerns the salaries rather than the working conditions as had hitherto been 
the case.  
Increased autonomy for employers has been associated with problems 
regarding the flexible use of the workforce, particularly in sectors marked by low-
skilled and often precarious jobs and low levels of trade union membership—
logistics, retail, cleaning, and security, for example.93 Although the second Aubry law 
stipulated that changes could be made to an employee’s work schedule only after a 
week’s notice had been served, meeting this délai de prévenance remains 
problematic―despite the fact that the same principle was reiterated in 2008―as 
frequent and sudden changes are made to work schedules and employees (or their 
representatives) are not always consulted.94 These problems in the aforementioned 
sectors are linked to the precarious nature of these jobs and the fact that low-skilled 
employees can be easily replaced. More importantly, the reversal of the hierarchy of 
norms has had a profound effect on the “ground”95 where the task of labor inspectors 
has become much harder because facts have to be compared to a much more 
complicated and highly individualized96 set of arrangements. This renders controls 
much more time-consuming, uncertain, and cumbersome. Though complexity is not a 
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new feature of French labor law, it reached unprecedented levels after 2002 and, 
especially, after 2007.  
In addition to undermining the credibility of the law and―often―the 
workers’ understanding of the rules that apply to them, complexity increases the 
importance of the operational autonomy and capacity of French labor inspectors. 
Labor inspectors have seen their autonomy reduced indirectly as a result of the 
growing significance of firm-level agreements whose complexity (coupled with 
additional duties) increases the demands made on inspectors’ limited time.97 In 
addition, increasingly complex legal and, more often, sector- and firm-specific 
arrangements increase the demand for (and the importance of) the inspectors’ 
advisory service. In addition, the reduction of support staff means that inspectors are 
compelled to deal with administrative matters to the detriment of their core function, 
which is to conduct inspections at the level of individual firms.98 These developments 
undermine the inspectors’ capacity to carry out their duties in the effective way that is 
required.  
Although the promotion of flexibility was not its exclusive trait, the Right 
significantly amplified it by reducing the gap between the hitherto higher level of 
protection offered by French domestic arrangements and the provisions of the 
directive, effectively turning the latter into a safety net. This is exemplified by the 
case of cadres. Under the governments of the Right what initially was a cadre-specific 
arrangement was transformed into a mechanism for the promotion of flexibility for 
much wider (and substantially different) groups of employees. The nature of this 
change owes a lot to the logic that permeates the directive’s opt-out clause. Although 
that option was not used when the directive was transposed into French law, the 
governments of the Right have promoted the logic that underpins it without explicitly 
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espousing it99 so as to avoid the associated political cost. This has led to the 
emergence of the opt-out à la française. Employers have used the flexible cadre-
specific arrangements as an opportunity to avoid meeting some of the requirements of 
the directive by extending them to a category of employees who―among labor 
inspectors―are known as faux cadres, employees who do not have the executives’ 
autonomy and receive a salary that is significantly inferior to that of a real executive. 
Rather, they were either arbitrarily classified as “cadres” or were initially attracted to 
this status as a result of the several additional days of paid holidays that are linked to 
it prior to realizing the problems that were associated with it (such as the safeguards 
that the unions wanted to see introduced and the fact that they can be legally expected 
to work up to 78 hours per week). The Right-wing governments’ subsequent 
extension of the scope of the forfait en jours has reduced the employers’ incentives to 
have recourse to this practice. It recognizes the reality on the ground and serves as a 
mechanism for the promotion of flexibility across the workforce and at the same time, 
it turns the directive into a real safety net since its provisions regarding daily and 
weekly rest periods (eleven and thirty-five hours respectively) apply. This broader 
trend does not eliminate sectoral differences. Large supermarkets and other similar 
chains (collectively known as grande distribution), the retail sector and IT services 
are more problematic than others but the root cause is not dissimilar to the one found 
elsewhere: these relatively new sectors are not permeated by the culture of trade 
unionism that exists elsewhere and collective negotiations take place at the level of 
the firm, rather than the sector.100  
 
Conclusion 
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Partisan government is at the heart of the four key choices that have characterized the 
implementation process in France. First, while the Jospin-led government explicitly 
avoided the introduction of the individual opt-out into the domestic arrangements, the 
post-2002 governments of the Right introduced it albeit in all but name. Far from 
exemplifying their attachment to the domestic arrangements, the fact that the French 
governments of the Right chose a less transparent approach owes a great deal to their 
determination to minimize the mobilization of opposition to their decision. Second, 
unlike the governments of the Left, those of the Right have reduced the capacity of 
labor inspectors to devote the required attention to policing the implementation of 
domestic legislation. Third, the decision of the governments of the Right to reverse 
the hierarchy of norms in employment law has undermined the capacity of the trade 
unions to promote the interests of the weaker party in employment relations. In 
contrast, this central decision has effectively turned working time arrangements into 
an element of competition between firms. Finally―and most crucially―unlike the 
governments of the Left, those of the Right have―since 2002 and more so since 
2007―treated EU policy as one that sets standards from which French arrangements 
should not depart drastically so as to ensure that French firms are not disadvantaged 
in comparison to their competitors from abroad. 
None of the alternative explanations can provide a better account than the 
partisan hypothesis. First, a culture-based account would not offer a convincing 
alternative because it does not explain the differences between the two parties. The 
culture did not change in 1997 or in 2002. The parties in government did. Second, the 
key changes did not result from the inability of the French politico-administrative 
machinery to cope with the exigencies of this directive. While it is true that a part of 
the pattern observed in the post-transposition stage can be attributed to the capacities 
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of the administrative actors involved in this process, these capacities have been shown 
to reflect clear political decisions of the government thus confirming the partisan 
hypothesis.  
This article reveals that a better understanding of the preferences of the ruling 
parties can shed light on the dynamics of this process. Much of the preceding analysis 
might indirectly be taken as an indication of the predominance of domestic policy 
considerations―the essence of the so-called “world of neglect”101―since compliance 
with the directive was not the primary objective of the Aubry laws or the legislation 
enacted by the Right after 2002. But if analysis ended with this assertion, it would be 
both misleading and incomplete since it would imply that domestic and EU policies 
can (or even should) be treated as separate constructs and one can (or does) operate in 
isolation from the other. In reality, EU policy is actually implemented not in a 
vacuum but in a specific socio-political milieu where ruling parties make 
consequential decisions and, potentially, a difference. There is evidence that the 
applicability of the partisan hypothesis is much broader than one might think.102 
Instead of replacing one sweeping claim with another, we need detailed comparisons 
within and across sectors that will help paint a more nuanced and accurate picture of 
the conditions in which parties make a difference.  
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